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I – Introduction 
 
The Great Recession of 2008-2009 and the subsequent period of stagnation is one of the 
most significant events in US economic history.  The financial bubble and subsequent 
collapses of the real estate and stock markets triggered a severe economic downturn.  
Real GDP dropped 4.0% from the second quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2009.  
Unemployment during this same period rose from 5.0% to 10.0%.  During the eight years 
following the crash, the labor force participation rate has fallen from 66.0% to 62.8% 
(Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. FRED II). Perhaps the most notable feature of the 
Great Recession was the impact on real estate and housing prices.  According to the 
Shiller Real Home Price Index, U.S. house prices reached a peak in 2006, then fell a 
staggering 34% by 2009 (Byun, 2010).    
In October 2008, the U.S. Congress authorized the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP), which eventually authorized $475 billion in bailout funds.  Of this total, $248 
billion was committed to stabilizing the banking sector, and $80 billion was committed to 
stabilizing the U.S. auto industry (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2016).  These were 
extraordinary fiscal policy moves, the likes of which have never been seen before in 
peacetime America.  It is not a surprise that economists have begun to make comparisons 
between the Great Recession and the Great Depression of the 1930s. (Koch, et al., 2016; 
Anderson, et al., 2017; Duca, 2017). 
Understandably, the Great Recession has generated much interest among scholars.  
Economists study the Great Recession with the hopes of understanding its root causes.  In 
doing so, researchers attempt to discover macroeconomic policy prescriptions that can 
help the US economy avoid economic catastrophes of this magnitude in the future.  One 
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area of research that has received considerable attention among economists is the role of 
monetary policy in contributing to the economic collapse.  To what extent was the 
Federal Reserve responsible for the stock market and more specifically the real estate 
bubbles that eventually burst, thus beginning the Great Recession?  In this paper, we will 
explore the connection of monetary policy to the Great Recession. 
The Federal Reserve is responsible for the United States’ monetary policy.  The 
Fed controls the US money supply in order to achieve macroeconomic stability.  The Fed 
board members analyze the conditions (e.g., output, unemployment, and inflation) of the 
U.S economy on a periodic basis and then make adjustments to the money supply that the 
members believe will bring about the desired outcomes.  One of the interesting aspects of 
monetary policy has to do with the methods by which appropriate policies are decided 
upon.  This presents a possible dilemma, and is often referred to as the “rules versus 
discretion debate” (Mankiw, 2013, 529-534).  On the one hand, the Fed might use a 
discretionary approach to monetary policy.  This method of policy choice is flexible, and 
allows the Fed to respond immediately to changing macroeconomic conditions.  On the 
other hand, the Fed may decide on policy using a rules approach.  Many economists 
believe that a rules approach to monetary policy, which would presumably cause money 
growth to be consistent, would cause greater stability in output, prices, and employment.  
The focus of this paper is to consider the rules-based approach to monetary policy, and to 
assess the possible use of one monetary policy rule in particular – the Taylor Rule.  By 
extension, we will consider use or neglect of monetary policy rules in the years leading 
up the Great Recession. 
 
 
3 
 The Taylor rule for monetary policy (Taylor, 1993) has received considerable 
attention in economic research. Economists have sought to determine the extent to which 
the Federal Reserve’s policy decisions have been impacted by the outcomes of the Taylor 
Rule.  More recently, economists have tried to find a connection between the Taylor 
Rule, monetary policy, and the events leading up to and during the Great Recession. This 
line of thought leads to some interesting questions.  Did the Federal Reserve policy over 
the last couple of years contribute to the housing price boom and bust? Or were there 
external factors yet to be discovered which could be attributed to being the cause of the 
crash in housing prices?  In this paper, we try to analyze these events, focusing mostly on 
the monetary events leading up to the Great Recession.  This paper provides a descriptive 
analysis of Federal Reserve (Fed) policy, its possible adherence or deviation from the 
Taylor Rule, and the extent to which these policy prescriptions contributed to the 2008 
financial crisis and recession.  
 The paper begins with a biographical sketch of John B. Taylor, dating back to his 
time as a professor at Columbia University to his term as the Senior Economist on the 
President’s Council of Economic Advisers.  We also review the economic theory that 
influenced Taylor in his creation of the Taylor rule.  The paper goes on to give a detailed 
analysis of the Taylor rule, which is coined the Federal Reserve’s “reaction function” 
(Kumar, 2013) due to the alterations made to monetary policy in response to economic 
developments. Then, a review of literature sheds light on various points of view 
regarding the 2008 financial crisis. On one hand, several economists such as A. 
Orphanides and R. Porter provide suggestions of the ineffectiveness of the Taylor Rule 
and its inability to perform efficiently during financial turmoil. On the other hand, the 
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possibility of a deviation by the Fed is brought up with the statistical evidence presented 
in the argument.  Here it will be instructive to examine what Taylor himself has to say on 
the issue, and an examination of Taylor’s views on the Great Recession will enhance our 
understanding.  The paper will conclude with our assessment of the competing arguments 
on this debate on monetary policy, and will propose ideas for future research on the topic.  
  
II John B. Taylor - Biographical Sketch 
 
  
John B. Taylor, born December 8, 1946, is the economist known for his 
contribution to the creation of the Taylor Rule, which establishes a relationship between 
the nominal interest rate and other macroeconomic factors. Currently an Economics 
professor at Stanford University, Taylor earned his Bachelor’s Degree in Economics at 
Princeton in 1968 and Ph.D. in Economics at Stanford in 1973 (Stanford Profiles). He is 
an expert in macroeconomics, monetary economics, and international economics.  Taylor 
is known for his research on modern policy theory which came about from his strong 
interest in public policy. It was from this interest that he was chosen to serve as senior 
economist on the President’s Council of Economic Advisers from 1976-1977, and again 
from 1989-1991.  
Taylor is generally thought of as a member of the New Keynesian school of 
economic thought.  His economic thought is also influenced by the works of economists 
Milton Friedman and Paul Volcker. Taylor took a special interest in Friedman whom he 
had interviewed some years back. They had indulged themselves in a two-hour long 
conversation on various topics ranging from the natural rate theory to the optimal 
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quantity of money, and money growth rules (Taylor, 2000). Through their conversation, 
it was evident that both Friedman and Taylor shared similar values regarding monetary 
policies. 
 New Keynesian economics is a modern school of thought that combines elements 
of microeconomics with macroeconomic models.  It is a school of thought in modern 
macroeconomics that was derived from the ideas of John Maynard Keynes (Mankiw, 
2008).  In the 1930s, Keynes constructed an economic theory to explain how recessions 
can be inherent to market-based economies.  For the most part, economic thought for 
roughly one hundred and fifty years prior to Keynes taught that market economies were 
characterized by flexible prices and wages.  This period of thought is known as the 
Classical school of economics. The interaction of supply and demand in goods, labor, and 
money markets would mean that prices, wages, and interest rates would freely adjust to 
changing conditions.  These market adjustments would prevent prolonged shortages or 
surpluses of goods, and would also prevent unemployment from being a long-term 
problem.  Classical economics therefore suggests that a free market economy tends to be 
inherently stable.  In addition, the Classical theory of economics is a body of thought that 
focuses on the supply side of the economy.   
Keynes disagreed with this assessment of the market economy.  He believed that 
markets do not always adjust in a predictable way - prices, wages, and interest rates are 
not always flexible.  According to Keynes, the actual “stickiness” of prices and wages 
can cause a general glut of goods, thus a recession.  The Keynesian theory is a statement 
of how government spending policies can be used to relieve an economy experiencing 
recessionary conditions.  To Keynes, demand was the more important side of the market, 
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and government spending should be used to stimulate aggregate demand.  Government 
spending, which cause increases in aggregate demand, would ultimately lift the economy 
out of recession and reduce unemployment. 
In the 1970s, questions were raised by economists such as Robert Lucas and 
Robert Barro (Mankiw, 2008) regarding the Keynesian school of thought.  These 
economists attempted to revamp the Keynesian theory of the 1930s, and the term “New 
Keynesian” was coined.  Like their predecessor Keynes, economists of this school of 
thought believe involuntary unemployment exists due to the “stickiness” of wages and 
prices in the economy (Mankiw, 2008).  However, they extend the analysis of Keynes to 
include microeconomic foundations.  New Keynesian economists blend the Keynesian 
notions of price and wage stickiness with the modern macroeconomic theories of rational 
expectations and Real Business Cycle Theory.   
Real Business Cycle (RBC) theory is a macroeconomic theory that focuses on 
how sudden and significant changes to the factors of production can impact a nation’s 
economy. It was developed by modern classical economists to explain cyclical 
fluctuations in the economy.  RBC economists believe that “productivity shocks” are the 
main cause of business cycles and recession. Productivity shocks include outcomes such 
as the development of new production methods, changes in the quality/quantity of capital 
and labor, sudden changes in raw material availability, and changes in government 
regulations that affect production (Abel, et al., 2017, pp. 366-367).  RBC therefore 
represents a return to the classical doctrine, where problems in the supply side of the 
economy are more important in understanding business cycles and recessions. 
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We can see that the theory that provides the foundation for Taylor’s thought, New 
Keynesian economics, is actually a synthesis of Classical economics and Keynesian 
economics.  Although it focuses on the supply side of the economy, it is a theory that also 
includes assumptions about sticky wages and prices. These macroeconomic models are 
often referred to as dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium (DSGE) models (Mishkin, 
2012, p. 571).  It was from this macroeconomic perspective that Taylor developed his 
famous rule to guide monetary policy.   
Given that we have considered Taylor’s theoretical influences, we now look at the 
Taylor Rule.  In the next section, we discuss the Taylor Rule for monetary policy.  A 
detailed discussion of each component of the Taylor Rule is included. 
  
III - The Taylor Rule 
 
Prior to the seeming reliance on the Taylor rule by the Federal Reserve, there was 
uncertainty as to what monetary policy rule was being used to manipulate the federal 
funds rate. In the period immediately preceding the advent of the Taylor Rule, the chairs 
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve were Arthur F. Burns (1970-1978) and 
Paul A. Volcker (1979-1987).  They were directing the Fed during the period of the Great 
Inflation (Bryan, 2013). After the conclusion of World War II, the Fed shifted its 
attention to policies focused on the promotion of maximum employment, production, and 
purchasing power (Bryan, 2013). This era was dominated by the use of the Phillips curve 
in monetary policy, which held that an inverse relationship between unemployment rate 
and inflation existed. The law implied that a decrease in unemployment would cause the 
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labor market to tighten, resulting in firms raising the wage rate in order to attract workers.  
Prices would also tend to increase and unemployment decreased.  The inverse is also true 
– an increase in the unemployment rate would coincide with a decrease in the inflation 
rate.  This trade-off between inflation and unemployment appeared to be the guiding 
principle of monetary policy during this time.  Economists such as Edmunds Phelps and 
Milton Friedman were, however, quick to criticize it, stating that the tradeoff between 
unemployment and inflation could not be sustained in the long-run (Hoover, 2008). 
Hence the need for a more reliable policy for the economy. 
The Taylor Rule was created as a form of recommendation for central banks, such 
as the Federal Reserve.  It suggests how the central bank should alter the interest rate 
depending on the economic condition in order to achieve the short-run goal of a stable 
economy and inflationary stability in the long-run (Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco, 1998). The rule follows the thought process that an economy performing 
above full employment is above its target.  It therefore usually experiences an increase in 
interest rate and vice versa.  The Taylor Rule is meant to guide the Federal Reserve in 
setting its monetary policy target, the real federal funds rate.  According to the rule, the 
federal funds rate should be set at its historical average of 2%, plus a weighted average of 
the inflation gap and the output gap (Mishkin, 2012, 329-330).   
By Taylor’s own admission, the Taylor Rule is quite straightforward.  The 
original formulation of the Taylor Rule is expressed like this (Taylor, 1993. P. 202):   
 
           r = p + .5y + .5 (p - 2) + 2 
  where  
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 r     =     the federal funds rate 
             p   =     the rate of inflation over the previous four quarters 
             y   =     the percentage deviation of real GDP from a target. 
            
The term r represents the federal funds rate to be implemented by the Federal 
Reserve. The principle behind the determination of the federal funds rate is that the 
federal funds rate is expected to rise in the event of inflation (p), rising above the set 
target rate of 2 percent, or if real GDP (y) surpasses the estimated GDP for a given 
economic year (Taylor, 1993). In the case where both the inflation rate and GDP are 
within the expected target, r would be equal to 4 percent, which is 2 percent in real terms. 
The term p serves as the rate of inflation over the previous four quarters. The 
reasoning behind using the rates from the previous quarters are for those quarters to serve 
as a benchmark for comparison for policymakers. Think of a company trying to measure 
the growth in revenue over the current financial year. It would be impossible for the 
company to do so without some sort of yardstick to evaluate its performance. It, 
therefore, has to look through the financials from previous years to identify its revenue, 
as well as to compare with the current year to determine whether there was growth or 
decline in revenue. This is why the inflation from the previous four quarters are used, 
hence it is safe to say that the policy operates in “real” terms. 
The term y is the percentage deviation of real GDP from a set target by the 
Federal Reserve, sometimes referred to as the output gap. The term y is determined by 
the formula 
y = 100 (Y - Y*)/Y* 
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where Y represents real GDP and Y* represents the trend in real GDP (this is also 
referred to as “potential real GDP”).  Taylor notes that the trend in real GDP was 2.2 
percent per year from 1984.1 to 1992.3.    The greater the difference between actual real 
GDP from estimated GDP, the greater the value of y, and vice versa. 
Taylor states that there is not a consensus about the size of the coefficients of 
policy rules.  However in his representative model expressed above, the coefficients of .5 
seem to “capture the spirit of recent research” and therefore seem justifiable. 
 Below are numeric simulations of an economy experiencing three different 
economic cycles.  Each situation is characterized by unique events in an attempt to 
demonstrate the recommendations made by the Taylor Rule. The first economy (economy 
A) is currently in a recessionary period. This period is characterized by slow economic 
growth in the economy and a high unemployment rate. We assumed a negative output 
gap in economy A given its underperformance, as well as an inflation rate of 1 percent 
during the financial period. 
 
Economy A:  
p = 1% 
y = -1.0 
Using the Taylor Rule, 
r = 1 + .5(-1.0) + .5(1 - 2) + 2 
   = 2.0% 
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The Taylor Rule recommends a low interest rate in order to stimulate the 
underperforming economy and also encourage spending from consumers who have 
lowered confidence in the current financial system and have a preference of holding their 
money. The second economy (economy B), is currently in a relatively normal state in 
which both the inflation rate and unemployment rate are closer to their “natural” rates. 
Unlike the economy in a recession, conditions in economy B are rather favorable and 
require little or no intervention from the central bank. 
Economy B: 
p = 2% 
y = 0.15 
Using the Taylor Rule, 
r = 2 + .5(0.15) + .5(2-2) + 2 
= 4.075% 
 As stated earlier, the economy needs little intervention in this economic period. 
The central bank might however, attempt to adjust the interest rate closer to the target rate 
of 2 percent. The last economy (Economy C), is currently experiencing a boom. 
Economic activity is at its peak with current output surpassing the expectations of the 
government and policy makers. Due to this, there is a relatively high inflationary pressure 
compared to the other economy, with a significant output gap. 
 
Economy C: 
p = 6% 
y = 2.0 
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Using the Taylor Rule, 
r = 6 + .5(2.0) + .5(6 - 2) + 2 
= 11.0% 
 
 The central bank in economy C would need to slow down the economy as the 
inflation rate is at risk of a further increase. It would therefore need to target a higher 
Federal funds rate in order to reduce money creation. 
According to Frederic Mishkin (2012, pp. 330-332) the Taylor Rule fairly 
accurately describes the Federal Reserve’s control of the federal funds rate after 1987 
under the chairmanship of Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke. Mishkin also shows that 
the Fed has not always followed the Taylor Rule since its creation.  Most notably, a 
divergence between the Taylor Rule and the federal funds rate begins around 2002.  The 
Taylor Rule indicates a federal funds rate that is higher than the actual Fed rate during 
that time.  It is also interesting to note that, according to Mishkin, during the 1970s, there 
was a large deviation between the federal funds rate forecasted by the Taylor Rule and 
the actual federal funds rate.  During this period the Taylor Rule suggested a rate 
considerably higher than that that actual existed by Fed policy.  This provides additional 
evidence that the 1970s were a period of substantial monetary inflation. 
 
IV-Review of Literature 
 
The 2008 financial crisis was coined the worst economic disaster since the Great 
Depression of 1929. Prior to this event, there were several warning signs such as the 
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housing bubble anomaly and the hike in the Fed rate that indicated a potential issue in the 
economy. The Federal Housing Price Real Index, according to the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency, showed a 40% increase in housing prices in 2007, compared to prices 
prior to 2000 which showed more gradual increases (Mislinski, 2018). This asset bubble 
resulted in a 52% decrease in housing prices by 2011 (Federal Housing Finance Agency), 
which is still in recovery as of today. According to the U.S Department of Treasury, real 
GDP fell to an all-time low from the pre-recession peak, the worst since the great 
depression (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Real GDP, Percentage Fall from Pre-Season Peak. Adapted from “The Financial Crisis Response” by the U.S Department of 
Treasury, 2012. 
The U.S Department of Treasury reported that 8.8 million jobs were lost during 
the 2008 financial crisis, with $19.2 (2011 dollars) trillion lost in household wealth 
(2012). Household debt as a percent of disposable income was at a high of approximately 
135% of their disposable income, with a large overhang of debt remaining as of today. 
FIGURE 2. 
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Figure 2. Household Debt, Percent of Disposable Income. Adapted from “The Financial Crisis Response” by the U.S Department of 
Treasury, 2012. 
 
So we proceed with the question of whether errant monetary policy contributed to 
the recession.  As discussed above, the Taylor rule is believed by many to be the guiding 
policy in which the Fed uses to determine the monetary policy. It is a formula that 
sanctions the “nominal interest rate” dependent on the inflation rate and the difference 
between the economy’s potential and the actual level of output (Vitruk, 2014, pg. 105).   
The rule specifies to what extent the federal funds rate should be adjusted in 
response to various macroeconomic pressures. However, several questions have been 
raised by economists such as McCallum (Vitruk, 2014, pg. 106), who criticize the Fed’s 
adherence to the rule, as well as its usefulness during economic periods of uncertainty. 
Opponents of the Taylor Rule claim that the problems result from the existence of 
fallibilities in the monetary system. Firstly, the Taylor Rule limits the Fed to choose a 
single measure of inflation from a list of various indices. Secondly, interest rates are 
formulated based on data gathered from previous years which might be invalid. Lastly, 
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the rule considers few variables that influence the policy, disregarding several significant 
variables in the process (Vitruk, 2014, pg. 107).  
Economists such as Jung, Porter, and Finan have suggested that the McCallum 
Rule would be a better alternative to the Taylor Rule given the exclusion of unobservable 
variables such as real interest rate and output gaps, which have proven difficult to 
measure over the years (Jung, 2017). The McCallum Rule, proposed by Bennett 
McCallum of Carnegie-Mellon University, targets the dollar value of output in an 
economy (Nominal GDP), by placing a benchmark for the growth rate of money supply.  
This consists of bank reserves and money in circulation (Croushore & Stark, 1995). The 
rule follows an adjustment mechanism in which monetary policy changes in response to 
the deviation in nominal GDP from its target. Should Nominal GDP be below the set 
target, economic growth is stimulated by increasing money growth which could be 
accomplished by lowering the Fed rate. This increase would encourage banks to borrow 
more. On the other hand, if Nominal GDP is above target rate, economic growth could be 
slowed down by increasing the required bank reserves, causing banks to reduce its 
monetary transactions.  
Advocates of the McCallum Rule such as Brian Motley and John Judd (Croushore 
& Stark, 1995) carried out research that suggests the rule’s reliability in various economic 
models. Studies from Croushore and Stark suggest that had the Fed followed the 
McCallum Rule rather than the discretionary policy adopted, inflation could have been 
significantly lower than the actual rates, with real output unchanged. Their studies also 
claimed that the adopted of the McCallum Rule would have avoided the Great 
Depression (Croushore & Stark, 1995).  
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Studies of some of the largest economies in the world such as Russia and China 
indicated that the McCallum Rule could be a suitable benchmark to assess central bank’s 
policy decisions (Jung, 2017). This is due to the effectiveness of the McCallum Rule 
during financial crisis where prolonged low-interest rates are bound to be experienced. 
During this particular situation, there is little or nothing that can be done using the Taylor 
Rule to stimulate the economy other than implementing a negative interest rate. 
 Jung (2017) favors a base money rule, which the McCallum Rule is, in favor of 
an interest rate rule. In his studies, the difficulty in accessing the state of the economy in 
real time makes a money based rule preferential to interest rate rules. Nations such as 
Japan, Spain, and Russia could find the adoption of money based rule as a good 
benchmark for their central banks.  Most central banks held to a low interest rate policy, 
with lower boundaries approaching zero (i.e., short-term interest rates were reduced to 
nearly zero). This increased the difficulty in interpretation for policy makers. This lends 
support for the adoption of a money based rule as opposed to an interest rate rule.  
On the opposite side of the spectrum are economists who believe in the 
effectiveness of the Taylor Rule. Most critics tend to draw an argument based off of the 
events that occurred prior and during the 2008 financial crisis. Ben Bernanke (2015) for 
example, believes that interest rates between 2003-2005 were held too low for too long 
by the Fed. This was extremely risky and likely contributed to the housing boom.  
Bernanke’s studies came to the conclusion that the adherence to the Taylor Rule 
could not have caused the housing boom. So the question of what exactly caused the 
financial crisis remains to be answered.  Questions by Taylor himself have been raised 
concerning the possibility of the Fed deviating from the Taylor rule years leading to the 
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financial crisis. A study by Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, et al., proposes a statistical method of 
distinguishing between a “rules-based” era and a “discretionary” era (2014). It was 
important to outline what these two eras meant since people tended to characterize the 
rules-based era with good economic performance and the discretionary era with relatively 
bad economic performance. Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, et al. identified the late 1960’s and 
1970’s as a period of the discretionary policy, 1980-1984 as a transition, 1985-2003 as 
the rules-based era, and 2003-2012 as the ad hoc era (Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy et al). Results 
from the study highlighted the superiority in terms of economic performance of the rules-
based era compared to the discretionary era which had a greater economic loss. The 
authors conclude that years after 2006 can be characterized as a discretionary era, which 
strengthens that argument that the Fed deviated from the original Taylor rule. Although 
deviating from the Taylor rule seems like a likely explanation for the financial bubbles 
that preceded the bust of 2008, it is still unclear whether this could be attributed as the 
sole cause of the Great Recession. 
 
V - Taylor’s Analysis of the Great Recession 
  
In Taylor’s book Getting off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions 
Caused, Prolonged, and Worsened the Financial Crisis, he makes a compelling argument 
that the Fed’s deviation of monetary policy from the Taylor Rule was the largest seen 
since the 1970’s, prior to the housing boom (Taylor 2009, pg. 2). Although the deviation 
by the Fed occurred due to fear of deflation, it could be identified as the root of the 
housing boom which inevitably led to the housing bust. Results from his study showed 
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that had the Fed complied with the Taylor Rule, the levels of the “counterfactual” 
housing starts would have been well below what the actual housing starts were. This, in 
turn, resulted in a gradual rise in overall prices, as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) level 
averaged 3.2%, 60% above the target suggested by policy makers (Taylor, 2009. Pg. 5). 
 
Figure 3. The Boom-Bust in Housing Starts Compared with the Counterfactual. Recreated from “Getting Off Track”, by Taylor, J. B., 
February 2009. 
  
 From Figure 3, had the Fed followed the Taylor Rule which is labeled 
“Counterfactual”, the huge housing boom and bust would have been avoided as the line is 
well below 1.8 million units. However, looking at the actual housing starts, it was evident 
that the housing bust was inevitable. 
 He also criticized the unusually low interest-rate set by the Fed in an attempt to 
avoid the threat of deflation after its occurrence in Japan in the 1990’s (Taylor, 2009, pg. 
3). From Figure 4, it is quite evident that the interest-rate set was well below what the 
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Taylor rule had prescribed. According to Taylor, this was the largest deviation by the Fed 
since 1970s. This was evidence of the monetary excess leading up to the housing boom as 
ease of lending for financial institutions became convenient, which meant more 
circulation of money in the economy. 
 
 
Figure 4. Federal Funds Rate, Actual and Counterfactual. Recreated from “Getting Off Track”, by Taylor, J. B., February 2009.  
  
Taylor goes on to look at the 2008 financial crisis from a global perspective. 
Some economists argue that some factors which were beyond the control of the monetary 
authorities might have had a role to play in the financial crisis. There were speculations 
of a global savings glut which drove down interest rates in the United States as well as 
other nations. Figure 5 depicts the global savings and investment glut that occurred 
during the period. From the graph the majority of the period was characterized by an 
excess of investments over savings, with the exceptions of 1970-1975 and 1995-1997. 
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However, empirical evidence suggests otherwise. Results show that although there was 
an excess between savings and investment globally (outside the United States),  it was 
offset by the current account deficit being experienced in the United States which 
generated no extra impact on the world interest rates. 
 
.
 
Figure 5. Global Saving and Investment as a Share of World GDP (in Percent). Recreated from “Getting Off Track”, by Taylor, J. B., 
February 2009. 
Taylor goes on to identify a potential alternative explanation for the crisis. Still 
based on a global outlook, Taylor believes that the deviation from the rule by the central 
banks in other countries could have contributed to the crisis. Data gathered showed that 
housing booms were largest in nations such as Spain, which deviated more from the rule. 
Other nations such as Austria experienced relatively less impact from the housing boom 
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due to their deviation. In summary, it seems to hinge on the central bank’s deviation 
(whether that of the United States or other nations) from the Taylor rule. 
 
VI - Conclusion: Future Research  
  
The topic of the 2008 financial crisis is one that has caused a divide in the 
financial world as economists have yet to come to a general conclusion for the primary 
cause of the crisis. On one side of the spectrum, some economists question the legitimacy 
of the Taylor rule and its usefulness before and during financial crisis such as the one that 
occurred in 2008. On the other side of the spectrum, economists such as Taylor argue that 
the Fed’s level of deviation was the sole cause of the housing bust, although other global 
factors might have had a role to play in the crisis.  
 It is understandable that the Fed was reluctant to follow the rule strictly as it 
would reduce their flexibility and adaptability in monetary policy. However, the 
threshold within which deviation would be permitted with little or no effect on the 
economy was seemingly surpassed, and as such, the Fed's decision could be identified as 
a likely cause of the 2008 financial crisis. The Fed policy could have been implemented 
better to avoid, or at least reduce, the impact of the crisis. Certain data, however, were not 
clearly conveyed in the aggregate financial statistics of the U.S economy which 
contributed to the severity of the crisis. The increase in reliance of short-term funding for 
longer-term financial instruments (such as bonds) which left the financial system 
vulnerable to a withdrawal of liquidity was difficult to identify from the data available 
(Eichner et al, 2010). There was also an increase in credit risk associated with the growth 
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in the home mortgage which left borrowers vulnerable to any decline in housing prices. 
The Fed policy was therefore not strong enough to protect the economy from the crisis. 
 There is still much to be studied regarding monetary policy adoption by the Fed 
and previous financial crises that have changed the scope for policymakers in the nation. 
The high level of uncertainty makes it difficult to discern the causes of such economic 
crisis, as well as to come up with safeguards to help prevent future occurrences. It would 
be beneficial in future research on the topic was directed toward attaining a numerical 
threshold within which deviation from the Taylor rule is acceptable. It is evident that 
deviation from the Fed had occurred prior to the 2008 financial crisis, along with other 
past periods. It is also evident that strict adherence to any monetary policy rule adopted 
reduces flexibility and rate of adjustment by the Fed. Finding a permissible range within 
which deviation from the Taylor rule causes no harm to the economy could prove quite 
useful for the Fed. 
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